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"Therefore send not to find for whom the 
bell tolls,... it tolls for thee".
John Donne.
General Equilibrium Theory regarded by many as the summura of the 
"grand neo-classical synthesis" has throughout its development been 
systematically attacked by a wide variety of critics from many different 
angles. Yet, curiously, these criticisms have been largely ineffective 
and it would not be unfair to say that this theory underpins what many 
are pleased to call "mainstream economics". Indeed such theory as is 
used by practical men to justify their economic recommendations is derived 
from this underlying framework albeit with unwarranted appendages. There 
seems to be a quiet confidence in the profession that we are moving, if 
only slowly, towards a more scientific basis for economics. Indeed, many 
economists seem persuaded that we are arriving at the point where the 
simplest criterion for a scientific theory, that it generate empirically 
testable and falsifiable propositions is met. This confidence that by 
enlarging the scope of the existing model without changing it fundamentally, 
we will be able to explain more and more satisfactorily observed economic 
phenomena, is not new.
Alchian (1965) said "Attacking any theory is easy enough, since none 
is perfect. But the wide class of empirical observations that explained 
by economic theory should caution one against sweeping that theory aside... I
I would like to thank Werner Hildenbrand for many helpful discussions and 
for specific comments, Walter Trockel for particularly enlightening comments 
and Pierre Dehez and Lucrezia Reichlin for their comments and insights. They 




























































































What is wanted is a generalization of economic theory to obtain an expanded 
scope of validity without eliminating any (or "too much") of the class of 
events for which it is already valid...". Others have gone further and 
suggest that the neo-classical road is the unique path to scientific 
economics. North (1978) said directly, "To abandon neo-classical theory 
is to abandon economics as a science".
Yet paradoxically those who have developed or are developing general 
equilibrium theory are less complacent. This lack of complacency is 
epitomised by Hahn (1981) and is due to his awareness of the strength of 
the assumptions necessary to yield the propositions which are then applied 
by practitioners to real phenomena. The "first theorem of welfare economics" 
that a competitive equilibrium is a Pareto optimum is frequently used by 
certain economists to justify the "liberal" position in economic policy.
Yet as Hahn says, "if these assumptions were stated and discussed they 
might be less inclined to declare free trade 'optimal1".
Paradoxically, there are many economists, some of distinction, who 
while staunch defenders of the basic tenets of general equilibrium theory 
have little but contempt for the abstract structure which gives the only 
rigorous justification for these tenets.
Hahn (1981) goes further however and observes "The ease with which so 
much current critique of General Equilibrium analysis can be countered is 
potentially dangerous. For as I said at the outset, the citadel is not at 
all secure and the fact that it is safe from a bombardment of soap bubbles 
does not mean that it is safe. Fortunately those "inside" have begun to 
build new walls and to lay new foundations".
Thus Hahn's position is that whilst we are heading in more or less 
the right direction the cause of economic theory is disserved by those who 
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My purpose in this paper is to make a more radical point and to 
suggest that recent results have shown that, in a sense, the citadel 
which we are vigorously rebuilding is empty. Empty if it is to be 
considered as housing the elements of a scientific theory in the simple 
sense that I have described, one that generates empirically testable 
propositions. I would like to go further and to argue that this emptiness 
is inherent in the fundamentally individualistic approach which is at the 
heart of general equilibrium theory as it stands.
These remarks should be interpreted with caution. What I am suggest­
ing is that those who are generalising standard results by weakening as­
sumptions, or by adding small imperfections or rigidities to the model, 
no doubt strengthen the walls in Hahn’s sense but the important task for 
the theorist is to people the citadel and, of course, many theorists are 
trying to address this task.
Criticism of the model
Before proceeding to explain the results in question I shall briefly 
look at some of those criticisms which as Hahn says, have proved remarkably 
ineffectual in stopping what many consider to be the inevitable progress 
of general equilibrium. This criticism will be relevant to what follows 
in that the results to which I have alluded lend force to what were some­
times misdirected arguments.
Much of this criticism is from without and argues that the very 
specification of the general equilibrium model is either tautological 
or misconceived. Whilst few question the logical coherence of this model 
many doubt its relevance to what they consider to be the essential problems 
of economics. This is not the place to review the wealth of critical 
literature that exists on this subject whether it be from schools or 
counter schools such as the Marxists, neo Ricardians, Keynesians, 
revisionist Keynesians, neo-Austrians etc. Collections of articles 
serving this purpose can be found in Bell and Kristol's (1981) "The Crisis 
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Without categorising the different criticisms we can say that there is 
a group who argue that economic evolution is essentially situated in time 
and cannot be reduced to the general atemporal "scientific model" which is 
that proposed by general equilibrium theory. Hicks (1979) remarked that 
"economics is on the edge of science and of history". He did not go 
quite so far as those who argue that it falls directly and unavoidably 
into the domain of history, but there is a long tradition of those who 
would maintain just that. In fact, Hicks argued that there may be suffi­
cient constancy over time of certain economic relationships to maintain 
them as rules or laws, at least in the short run. Such a view is, of 
course, in a formal sense, incompatible with the full-blown Arrow-Debreu 
general equilibrium model since in that model everything is decided once 
and for all, and there are no repetitions. The economist frequently seeks 
to overcome this paradox by assuming some "separability" of utility over 
time, or those who consider a model with stochastic elements look for some 
sort of stationarity. In this way the economy can be reduced to something 
like a repeated experiment and thus one can reasonably hope to look for 
irregularities in reality which would be incompatible with this picture.
I will return briefly to this and its relation to the evolution of 
economic theory in a moment.
Whilst the most extreme version of this view maintains that economics 
is intrinsically nonscientific other criticisms are addressed more 
directly at the specific model which is epitomised by general equilibrium 
theory. Here some of the schools, referred to earlier, question essential 
features of the model. However rather than detail these criticisms 
which would amount to summarising a century of heated debate, I will 
just mention some that will be particularly relevant to what follows.
There are those who argue that the underlying hypothesis of individual 
maximisation is inappropriate and that such an assumption is unnecessarily 
restrictive. Simon's work, with others, is often thought of as being a 
welcome and healthy alternative approach to the problem of individual 




























































































is one in which individuals react in some continuous way to signals 
(prices) it is formally equivalent to the Arrow-Debreu model.
A second objection is to the notion of equilibrium. In this view 
those signals (prices) which equilibrate demand and supply and thus make 
individuals' actions consistent although proved to exist in an Arrow-Debreu 
world, may not be attained. There are two problems here; in the first 
place if we do not allow all prices to be possible then we must redefine 
"equilibrium" and allow a different sort of compatibility between supply 
and demand, by imposing quantity restrictions, for example, than that 
envisaged in the standard model. This is, of course, the position main­
tained in the extreme case by the Barro-Grossman, Dreze, Benassy, Malinvaud 
literature. The question asked here is, if the domain of prices is 
restricted can we redefine an equilibrium notion and show that it exists.
A second point is that when discussing whether or not equilibrium "will be 
attained" many authors are, at least implicitly, introducing the idea of an 
adjustment mechanism. They are asking much more than what is specifically 
proved in the Arrow-Debreu model. They wish to know whether with respect to 
some adjustment process, most commonly, the Walrasian tatonnement process, 
there is an equilibrium which is stable. Indeed, one formal interpretation 
of Keynes' major contribution is that he allowed for the possibility that in 
a general framework the standard adjustment process might not push the 
economy towards equilibrium. Without the stability of equilibrium 
changing one price (wages in this case) in the "right" direction might move 
the economy further from equilibrium. It is worth emphasising at this point 
that there are no "individualistic" assumptions of the sort used in the 
Arrow-Debreu model which will guarantee stability nor are there such 
assumptions which will ensure uniqueness of equilibrium. Such assumptions 
as are known are made at the aggregate level and are of an intrinsically 
different nature than those made on the endowments, production possibilities 
and preferences of individuals.
A slightly different point but one which goes in the same direction 
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the precise content of general equilibrium theory. He says: "If economists 
successfully devise a correct general equilibrium model, even if it can be 
proved to possess an equilibrium solution, should it lack the institutional 
backing to realize an equilibrium solution, then that equilibrium solution 
will amount to no more than a utopian state of affairs which bears no 
relation whatsoever to the real economy".
Without any strong stability or convergence result it is true that 
the corpus of economic theory seems to be wanting. In particular if one 
thinks of the way in which economics is taught and justified, it involves, 
in an essential way, stories about adjustment. The "invisible hand" is, 
after all, the adjuster par excellence. Yet despite the lack of any such 
formal result to underpin the view that the economy can be treated as a 
process evolving towards an orderly situation there are those who strongly 
urge such a view.
For example Buchanan (1982) says "The 'order' of the market emerges 
only from the process of voluntary exchange among participating individuals. 
The 'order' is, itself, defined as the outcome of the process that 
generates it. The 'it', the allocation-distribution result does not, 
and cannot, exist independently of the trading process. Absent this 
process, there is and can be no 'order'".
A last criticism and one which has its relevance to what follows is 
that economics has been developed within a mathematical paradigm which is 
not really appropriate to the reality it wishes to portray. The view that 
economists have been trapped in a system derived essentially from 19th 
century mechanics is one which has been forcefully put by Ingrao and Israel 
(1987) in their recent book "La mano invisibile". This is far from novel 
as an observation but, argued carefully, is more convincing than the usual 
remark that the general equilibrium model is static and ought to be 
dynamic. For as Samuelson (1947) remarked, "Often in the writings of 
economists the words 'dynamic' and 'static' are used as nothing more than 
synonyms for good and bad, realistic and unrealistic, simple and complex.





























































































If the mathematical paradigm which we have adopted is indeed essentially 
static in nature then we will inevitably come face to face with the 
contradiction inherent in the dynamic nature of economics.
Before reaching this crisis however it seems that we have arrived at 
the point where the current model is shown to be intrinsically incapable 
of generating verifiable propositions. In other words instead of 
occupying themselves with defense against attacks from without general 
equilibrium theorists should be and indeed many are reflecting on the prob­
lem within. Thus what now follows is an account of how we have arrived at 
an impasse unaided by exterior criticism. A last word is in order before 
proceeding to detail the results in question. Lest the ordinary economist 
should regard this as merely the whimsical fantasy of the mathematical 
economist he should reflect on the fact that what is explained here under­
mines the major part of the justification of "everyday" economic analysis.
Far from being a purely abstract theoretical problem it is one of real 
significance for practising economists. Some of the latter are well aware 
of this and I will try to explain precisely why this is the case in my 
conclusion.
Fundamental but negative results
For the moment let me consider the simplest basic general equilibrium 
model, that of pure exchange, and let me come back later as to whether 
that restriction is one which favours the conclusions that I draw.
In the standard exchange model in which there are a finite number l 
of goods and n of consumers, with remarkably few assumptions on individuals' 
characteristics, we can prove the existence of an equilibrium. That is we 
can find, for a given exchange economy £, a price vector p* and an allocation 
f* to each of the individuals a in the set of agents A such that the excess 
demand Z(p) function of the economy is zero for every good



























































































Without giving all the standard notation and assumptions let us first 
note that if an individual a's demand function is expressed by ̂ >(a,p) 
the aggregate excess demand Z is given by
Z(p) = E $ (a,p) - Ee(a)
aeA aeA
where e(a) is the initial endowment of individual a.
The student’s first reaction to the standard assumptions made on 
preferences, that they should be given by a continuous, convex, monotone 
preorder, is that they are too strong to be realistic. He then derives 
considerable comfort from the fact that these assumptions may be weakened 
whilst the existence of an equilibrium is preserved. Indeed, in passing, 
it should be observed that if we are simply interested in existence of 
equilibria then remarkable results have been obtained for "large economies". 
Since such large economies are precisely those where perfectly competitive 
bahaviour makes sense this is reassuring. As an example, the assumption of 
the convexity of preferences which is vital in small economies, becomes "less 
important" in large finite economies and is unnecessary in the perfect ana­
logue of pure competition, the continuum economy. Thus for the problem of 
existence of equilibrium aggregation over individuals helped considerably.
Yet paradoxically as the reader will see the problem of aggregation will 
be the source of woes in what follows. Given the nature of the general equi­
librium model it is clear that the existence of such an equilibrium is a 
first and crucial test of its consistency. Yet once this first test is 
passed we obviously wish to know more. What restrictions are imposed by 
the basic "individualistic" assumptions that I have just mentioned? If 
we are interested in questions of stability with respect to some adjust­
ment process, in the uniqueness of equilibrium, or in comparative statics 
then one would hope that the assumptions made would restrict the admissible 
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Put another way, we know that uniqueness and stability results can 
be obtained by making assumptions on the aggregate excess demand function.
The question then is do the individualistic assumptions we make restrict 
possible aggregate excess demand functions to ones satisfying this sort of 
assumption?
Now before proceeding it should be said that, in a certain sense, as 
I have remarked, theory has made considerable progress in adding structure 
to individual demand functions when they are aggregated. Thus while indi­
viduals may have neither continuous demand functions nor correspondences 
yet if they have sufficiently dispersed preferences, the aggregate demand 
will be, in general, a smooth^ function. This confirms an old intuition 
which was already expressed by Cournot (1838) when he said,
"We will assume that the function F(p), which expressed the law of 
demand or of the market, is a continuous function ... It might be other­
wise if the number of consumers were very limited ... But the wider the 
market extends, and the more the combinations of needs, of fortunes or 
even of caprices, are varied among consumers, the closer the function 
F(p) will come to varying with p in a continuous manner. However little 
may be the variation of p, there will be some consumers so placed that 
the slight rise or fall of the article will affect their consumptions..."
This result has been since formalised and a full account may be found 
in Trockel (1984).
Thus starting from "badly behaved" individuals, we arrive at a situation 
in which not only is aggregate demand a nice function but by a result of 
Debreu equilibrium will be "locally unique". Whilst this means that at least 
there is some hope for real stability, the real question is, can we hope to 
proceed and obtain global uniqueness and stability? 1




























































































The unfortunate answer is a categorical no! Sonnenschein (1972) 
gave a fundamental result which, together with his (1973) and Debreu's 
(1974) results, yield the conclusion that even with strong individual­
istic assumptions no restrictions other than the following three are 
imposed on aggregate excess demand functions. Z.
1) Z(p) is continuous for all strictly positive prices, i.e. p in P
2) Z(p) satisfies Walras' law i.e. p.Z(p) = 0
3) Z(p) is homogeneous of degree 0 i.e. Z (A p) = Z(p) for A>0.
Thus perversely, even by imposing the most exacting requirements on 
individuals, we get even less structure than that obtained by aggregating 
much less well behaved agents behaviour, if their characteristics are 
dispersed.
When Sonnenschein's first result appeared it was dismissed by 
some since it said that one could closely approximate arbitrary functions 
satisfying the above properties by aggregate excess demand functions of 
economies with "well-behaved" individuals. This was clarified by the 
later result of Debreu (1974) which can be stated as follows.
Theorem: Given a continuous function f : p->- R satisfying Walras' Law,
i.e. p.f(p) = 0 for all p in P then for any positive epsilon £ there is
an economy £  with consumers with strictly convex monotone preferences
This result says that any arbitrary continuous function satisfying 
Walras' Law f: A£ •* R concides, for those prices, with the excess demand 
function of any economy with l well behaved consumers.
such that
f(p)=* Z£(p) for all p in A£
Here Z£ is the excess demand of the economy £ and A£ is the price 




























































































Stated as it is here it might seem that any continuous function from 
positive prices into satisfying Walras' law is the aggregate excess 
demand for some economy
This is, as Balasko (1986) says, not true but it is not obvious that 
the misinterpretation is harmful in some way. In fact aggregate excess 
demand functions of exchange economies also have "boundary properties", 
that is, when the price of one good goes to zero average excess demand 
goes to infinity. To see the problem consider the case of two goods and 
then normalise prices so that + p2 = 1 and by Walras' law that 
p^Z^(p) + p2Z2(p) = 0 it is sufficient to consider the graph of Z^(p).
The conditions given earlier together with boundary behaviour imply that the 
aggregate excess demand for the first good must look something like the 





























































































Two things should be noted. Firstly Z^(p) becomes negative for high 
p. Secondly, Z^(p) goes to infinity as p^ approaches zero. Since Z^(p) 
is continuous in this simple case there must be at least one equilibrium 
i.e. at least one price at which Z^(p) and hence Z2 (p) are zero. Thus 
excess demand functions have equilibria and this already means that not 
"any" continuous function can be an aggregate excess demand function for 
all prices. Nevertheless if we are prepared to restrict our attention 
to prices not too close to zero, however small, then any continuous 
function can indeed be, for that range of prices, an aggregate excess 
demand function. Think of the function f^(p) = 1 and hence f^ (p) 
































































































The function f clearly cannot be obtained as an aggregate excess demand 
function for any economy satisfying the standard assumptions. Nevertheless 
if we restrict our attention to prices, for example, to ones such that 
then we can construct an economy having an aggregate excess demand function 
looking like that in figure 3.
Figure 3
For the prices in question this coincides precisely with that specified 
above. This can be done for p^>e for however small the e provided it is 
positive.
I have belaboured this point since Balasko says "It turns out that 
many non-mathematically oriented economists have understood the above 
results as saying that the aggregate excess demand function can be 
arbitrary besides being continuous and satisfying Walras’ Law... this 
confusion is harmful and that the so-called intuition associated with the 
above results is incorrect".
Although from a mathematical point of view he is right, the fact that 
certain functions satisfying our conditions cannot be excess demand functions 
for all prices is of little interest for the economist. I do not agree there­




























































































we can make the correct statement. Since even with boundary conditions, 
we have no restrictions which will help to obtain global uniqueness or 
stability I doubt that there are many economists who would regard this 
as a buoy of hope cast to them as they struggled in a sea of doubt.
In fact the point of this paper is, of course, that most economists are 
not even concerned over the sea-worthiness of the vessel which they are 
sailing.
To return now to the basic argument. Mantel (1976) reinforced the 
negative Debreu and Sonnenschein results by showing that one could in 
fact make even stronger assumptions on individual characteristics and 
still not remove the arbitrary nature of the aggregate excess demand 
function. He showed that one can generate arbitrary functions (with the 
caveats mentioned above) even if one assumes that all individuals have 
homothetic preferences, i.e. always spend a fixed proportion of their 
incomes on each good. This is, of course, a much stronger requirement 
than those needed for the existence of equilibrium. Thus three standard 
initial objections to the relevance of these results were removed. The 
excess demand function could be fitted exactly, and not just approximated 
over the range of prices considered. The number of consumers needed in 
the economy was no greater than the number of goods (in these days when 
the passion for infinite dimensional commodity spaces prevails, the value 
of this restriction might be questioned) and preferences could be extremely 
well behaved.
Two further objections remained. Firstly the distribution of 
endowments might have to be very "odd" and secondly preferences might 
have to be dispersed in a rather exaggerated way in order to obtain 
some particular function as an aggregate excess demand function. Indeed 
Deaton (1975) showed that thoughtful empirical economists do take serious 
account of theoretical developments by noting the impact of the Debreu, 
Sonnenschein results on work in applied demand analysis. However he 
argued, ".... this does not mean that the theory is incapable of gener­
ating empirically useful restrictions on patterns of behaviour. Such 




























































































of Sonnenschein and of Debreu ... remove the basis for an unqualified 
belief in such a position, yet the construction of arbitrary demand (sic) 
functions requires arbitrary manipulation of the income distribution 
and of preferences, and it is unlikely that the fates manipulated real 
income with the sole object of frustrating demand analysis".
Unfortunately this is placing too much confidence in the fates, for 
the income distribution does not have to be manipulated, it can be chosen 
arbitrarily and furthermore one can generate arbitrary excess demand 
functions by using individuals all of whom have identical preferences.
In other words, taking these two things separately, the income distribution 
has no impact on the sort of aggregate excess demand function that can be 
obtained in a finite economy. In fact the income distribution can be 
chosen at will. The simplest way to see this is to construct for the 
given function an exchange economy a la Debreu in which each individual 
i possesses some fraction of the total resources. The (price indepen­
dent) income distribution is then given by the £ numbers a.. each of which 
gives the proportion of total income owned by individual i.
Now, Debreu*s construction only requires a certain minimum amount of 
goods for each individual, so, provided total endowments are big enough this 
requirement will be satisfied. Notice further that if the income distri­
bution required is described by more than £ numbers no problem is posed 
since it is always possible to construct an economy with more than the l 
individuals required by Debreu.
Thus restricting income distribution alone will not help, contrary 
to the hope expressed by Deaton. However, if we now restrict the dispersion 
of preferences will this help us to get out of the impasse? That such a 
restriction may help is clearly what Grandmont (1987) has in mind when he 
writes "Economic Theory is plagued by quite a few embarrassing results.
An obvious example is social choice theory with Arrow’s famous impossibi­
lity theorem.... No less important is the Debreu-Sonnenschein claim that 
summation over consumers does not place any other restrictions on competi­




























































































prices. The principle of a possible solution to the problem has been known 
for some time but has not yet been implemented much successfully. It is to 
put restrictions not so much on the support of the distribution of the 
agents' characteristics but on its shape".
The idea is clear, by restricting the dispersion of preferences i.e. the 
"size of the support" but also by restricting the way in which individuals 
are distributed one could hope to obtain restrictions on the aggregate 
excess demand functions that could be generated.
It is obvious, in fact, that by making this observation Grandmont 
is leading up to a result. However this result is for an economy with 
an infinite number of consumers. Indeed the first result linking the 
distribution of characteristics to restrictions on excess demand functions 
was given by Hildenbrand (1983a) for an infinite economy. I will come back 
to the relation between this and the negative results for finite economies 
and the relation between Hildenbrand's and Grandmont's results a little 
later but for the moment the following should be clear. For finite 
economies an arbitrary excess demand function can be generated for 
"compact price sets", (in terms of the previous discussion those with 
prices above some positive ) by economies with any income distribution 
and in which all individuals have identical preferences.^ Thus there 
is no hope that making the distribution of preferences or income "not too 
dispersed" or "single peaked" will help us to avoid the fundamental problem.
This easy extension of the Debreu-Sonnenschein result which is the 
last nail in the coffin of hopes for theoretical restrictions on finite 
economies can be expressed as follows. 1
(1) One word of caution, obviously individuals' incomes cannot be identical, 
since otherwise the economy would behave as one individual and its excess 






























































































Let n be an integer greater or equal to & and and 
be n different positive real numbers with v^+ ...+v^ = 1.
Let f:A->- R5, be continuous and satisfy Walras’ Law then for
every e > 0 there exists a continuous monotonie strictly convex_ £ 
preference relation ^ on R and an endowment vector e in R such
that the aggregate excess demand function of the individuals
i = 1 ... n having the preference relation 2 and the endowment
v_̂ e sum up to f on Ae.
I have spelled out this result in detail so that there can be no 
ambiguity. Repeating yet again, except for prices smaller than a positive 
e, which can be as small as one wants, any continuous function satisfying 
Walras’s Law can be considered as the excess demand of an economy with any 
large but finite number of individuals having identical preferences. 
Moreover the individual endowments can be chosen proportional to each 
other so that any given v^ ... v^ represent the price-independent 
distribution of relative income.
Escape routes
The question now arises as to how can we still obtain in the context 
of the general equilibrium model Deaton's "empirically useful restrictions" 
on excess demand functions? As I have observed, a possible route has been 
suggested by Hildenbrand (1983a) which is to put restrictions on the shape 




























































































distribution. What he shows is that the mean demand of a continuum of 
consumers with identical preferences is strictly monotonic (i.e. obeys 
the "Law of Demand") if the price independent distribution of wealth has 
a decreasing density (i.e. if the proportion of individuals in each 
successive income class is smaller and smaller). Now it would seem that 
this is in contradiction with the result given above. However, this is 
not the case since Hildenbrand requires that mean income be finite. In 
order to generate a sequence of economies having as its limit a continuous 
economy with the appropriate income distribution per capita income must 
necessarily be unbounded.
The question that is then posed, is whether the fact that the mean 
income of individuals becomes arbitrarily large as one tries to approximate 
an arbitrary income distribution with a large number of individuals is 
intrinsic. In other words if one imposes some bounds on the income of 
individuals is there the hope of getting back meaningful restrictions on 
excess demand functions.^ Although this is an open question it is a 
rather small hope on which to reconstruct the scientific basis of general 
equilibrium theory. It should be noted in passing that restrictions on 
the distribution of preferences such as those proposed by Grandmont (1987) 
do not advance our problem for the moment, since they can be shown to be 
obtained directly from the restrictions on the income distributions imposed 
by Hildenbrand (1983a), by a simple change of variable, as Grandmont himself 
points out. This does not necessarily mean however that there are no restric­
tions on the distribution of preferences which will improve the picture. There 
is still hope that with rather general conditions on the distribution of pre­
ferences we may get back the sort of structure obtained by Hildenbrand but for 
a less restrictive class of economies. This is because we have more freedom 
in specifying a distribution of preferences than an income distribution. 1
(1) Clearly such bounds can only be given once the function and the set of 
prices i.e. the e such that p >€ for all commodities are known. Nevertheless 





























































































One possible solution is then through restrictions on the distribution 
of agents’ characteristics, which I have to emphasize again is a clear break 
with the strictly individualistic tradition.
Another suggestion is that made by Hildenbrand (1983b) which is that 
the problem of restriction is possibly due to the omission of production 
in the model considered. He suggests that the pure exchange model is in 
fact not a suitable basic model for economics even though it has so long 
been used as one.
Whilst no-one could quarrel with the general truth of this statement 
there are two objections to the view that this is the root of the problem 
that we are discussing. Firstly production as it is typically treated 
in the general equilibrium model can be argued to yield little more than 
a glorified exchange economy. Indeed old results of Rader (1972) point 
in this direction. Thus it would be surprising if the introduction or 
rather consideration of production per se would significantly alter 
those results obtained in the exchange model. A second and more discon­
certing argument is that provided by Kehoe (1985). He suggests that the 
introduction of production may actually worsen matters in the following 
sense. Suppose that one is looking for restrictions on economies that 
yield unique equilibria, then some of those conditions which guarantee 
uniqueness for pure exchange economies do not do so for production 
economies. Thus when production is added to an economy, in which there 
is gross substitutability in demand, the equilibrium is no longer 
necessarily unique. Thus already in the pure exchange case we cannot 
restrict the form of the excess demand function through individualistic 
assumptions, adding production except of a totally unnatural sort 
(complete reversibility) destroys the power of some of the conditions 
for uniqueness and stability at the aggregate level. This would seem to 
imply that introducing production seems to give us more and not fewer 
degrees of freedom in constructing arbitrary excess demand functions. 
Worse still, Hildenbrand (1987) has shown recently that if we consider 
economies in which individuals own pure factors of production from which 
they derive their income and consume the other goods then almost no eco­





























































































All of this might seem unequivocal but, in fact, the addition of production 
can help. The intuition behind this is that in an exchange economy income 
is very directly linked to the prices of consumer goods. By introducing 
production and ownership of factors we can reduce this direct dependence 
and this, in turn, can push the economy towards one of the conditions 
guaranteeing uniqueness or stability. In Scarf's famous example in­
stability is crucially dependent on the distribution of initial resources 
through the income effect of price changes. Introducing production can 
reduce such dependence.
Thus the question as to whether the introduction of production as 
normally specified helps is still an open one. Of course it may well be 
true that a better model of production might make a radical change but 
this is a different question.
Demand rather than excess demand functions.
The reader will have noticed that all of the remarks so far have been 
addressed to the properties of excess demand functions rather than to those 
of demand functions. That the situation is not quite the same in the two 





























































































Suppose that we consider an aggregate demand function which takes on the 
two values illustrated in figure 4. This clearly violates the Weak Axiom 
of Revealed Preference (W.A.R.P.). Could it be generated by individuals 
with classic preferences? Obviously not since all consumers at prices p* 
consume only good 1 whilst at prices p all consumers consume only good 2 
thus there must be a violation of the W.A.R.P. at the individual level, 
which is a contradiction. Thus at least some additional restrictions are 
imposed on market demand functions. Whether such restrictions are of any 
real importance is open to question and for a discussion the reader can 
see for example Shafer and Sonnenschein (1982) but it does not look very 
likely that the distinction between demand and excess demand will be our 
saving grace.
The Realism of Assumptions
Without entering into the long methodological debate on this topic 
it might be argued that the obvious way out of the difficulties presented 
here would be to examine the realism of the assumptions made in building 
the general equilibrium model. One view is that it is only the results 
that can be deduced from assumptions that should be tested and that any 
assumptions that lead to consequences compatible with reality are acceptable. 
A less extreme view is that advanced by Pareto that one should look at 
"man as he is" and should not be afraid of asking whether assumptions 
are realistic. The problem here is that within the strict context of the 
Arrow-Debreu model the basic assumptions are not really testable unless 
additional hypotheses as to separability in time or stationarity in a 
stochastic context are added. If an individual makes choices once and 
for all and never has to repeat them in the same circumstances then no 
contradiction can be observed. This is the same as observing one 
realisation of a stochastic process, nothing can be deduced. Paradoxi­




























































































the context generalised and hence the possibility of observable contradic­
tion reduced. If individuals are choosing between infinite streams of 
consumption, their choice can never be observed to be contradictory.
Thus the great generality of the structures within which we can prove 
the existence of equilibrium is, of itself, making the verification of 
the underlying hypotheses further from reality. If we remember Solow's 
(1979) remark: "All theory depends on assumptions which are not quite true. 
That is what makes it theory"; the "not quite" has become less and less 
meaningful.
Again, Koopmans (1979) said: "In all formal procedures involving 
statistical testing or estimation, there are explicitly stated but untested 
hypotheses ... In ... econometric studies ... the "premises" (e.g., profit 
maximization, maximization of satisfaction) ... play that role. More in 
general, any statement resulting from such studies retains the form of an 
"if ... then ... " statement...
The "if ... then ..." statements are similar to those in the formal 
sciences. They read like logical or mathematical reasoning in the case 
of economic theory, and like applications of statistical methods in the 
case of econometric estimations or testing. The heart of substantive 
economics is what can be learned about the validity of the ’ifs' themselves, 
including the ’premises1 discussed above. ’Thens' contradicted by 
observation call, as time goes on, for modification of the list of ’ifs’ 
used. Absence of the contradiction gradually conveys survivor status to 
the ’ifs’ in question. So, I do think a certain record of noncontradiction 
gradually becomes one of tentative confirmation. But the process of 
confirmation is slow and diffuse."
It seems that as time goes on the "thens" have become impossible to 




























































































The basic premise of this paper is that the fundamental underpinnings 
of most modern economic work and indeed of quantitative work is the 
general equilibrium model. Now there will be many economists who view 
the latter as a special branch of economics and will be perfectly happy 
that this branch should have painted itself into a corner. However if one 
examines carefully the terminology employed in the less theoretical 
literature one constantly finds reference to "the equilibrium" or "the 
natural rate" and moreover a discussion as to how long the economy will 
take to return to the equilibrium. The underlying assumptions of uniqueness 
and stability are clear, yet as should be clear by now such assumptions have 
no theoretical justification.
A simple view of the world would be one in which theorists regard their 
work as self contained and not, at least at present, relevant for empirical 
work whilst applied economists regard theory as only being, in some loose 
way, useful as a justification for their work.
Such a simple view is however belied by the protagonists’ statements. 
Theorists are not sô  detached from reality. Why does Grandmont (1987) 
describe the results I have mentioned as "embarrassing". Why does Dreze 
(1987) when talking of the way to incorporate uncertainty into the general 
equilibrium model say "In that way, general equilibrium theory takes life 
and acquires substance" if he has not in mind a move in the direction of 
something more useful for understanding reality?
Perhaps the strongest statement was that of Samuelson (1947) whose 
"Foundations of Economic Analysis" was subtitled "The Operational Signifi­
cance of Economic Theory" and who said that one of his purposes in writing 
the book was to derive "operationally meaningful theorems" from economic 
theory i.e. theorems which said something "about empirical data which could 




























































































On the other side the role of theory in the work of applied econo­
mists and econometricians is clearly illustrated by Pagan (1987) who says 
when describing Hendry's econometric methodology:
"Theory and data continually interplay in this methodology. Unless 
there are good reasons for believing otherwise, it is normally assumed 
that theory accepts which variables should enter a relationship and the 
data is left to determine whether the relationship is static or dynamic 
(in the sense that once disturbed from equilibrium it takes time to 
re-establish it".
Thus the conceptual framework within which such econometric models 
are formulated is precisely that which does not seem to be justified by 
theory as it stands.
Conclusion
Having come so far in what is clearly a rather negative and provo­
cative exercise it seems only fair to try to identify the source of the 
problem. I personally do not find the argument that the root of the 
problem lies in the assumptions made as to the optimising behaviour of 
agents, nor that we are confined by a mathematical strait jacket which 
allows us no escape. That the mathematical frameworks that we have used 
have made the task of changing or at least modifying our paradigm hard, is 
undeniable but it is difficult to believe that had a clear well-formulated 
new approach been suggested then we would not have adopted the appropriate 
mathematical tools.
The problem seems to me to be embodied in what is an essential feature 
of a centuries-long tradition in economics, that of "methodological individ­
ualism". To use Boland's (1982) definition: "Methodological individualism 
is the view that allows only individuals to be the decision-makers in any 
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To base economic theory on such an approach is not to deny any 
interaction between individuals for as Samuelson (1963) says:
"... individualistic atoms of the rare gas in my balloon are not 
isolated from the other atoms. Adam Smith, who is almost as well known 
for his discussion of the division of labor and the resulting efficiency 
purchased at the price of interdependence, was well aware of that. What 
he would have stressed was that the contacts between the atoms were 
organized by the use of markets and prices".
To argue in this way, however, suggests that once the appropriate 
signals are given, individuals behave in isolation and the result of 
their behaviour may simply be added together. Then the equilibrium 
signals can be determined.
It is precisely this denial of any organic content of society as 
such that seems to me to lead to the lack of conclusions for general 
equilibrium theory. It is not mere chance that one assumption that 
leads to strong results on uniqueness and stability is that society should 
behave as an individual is supposed to in our existing theory. If we are 
to progress further we may well be forced to theorise in terms of groups 
who have collectively coherent behaviour. Thus demand and expenditure 
functions if they are to be set against reality must be defined at some 
reasonably high level of aggregation. The idea that we should start at 
the level of the individual is one which we may well have to abandon.
There is no more misleading description in modern economics than the so- 
called micro-foundations of macro-economics which in fact describe the 
behaviour of the consumption or production sector by the behaviour of one 
individual or firm. If we aggregate individuals, as I have already 
explained at length, such a model is unjustified. On the other hand 
if we do not then we should be honest from the outset and assert simply 
that by assumption we postulate that each sector of the economy behaves 




























































































this attempt to obscure or avoid the aggregation problem is an old one.
We only have to think back to the long and heated debate over the signi-
i
ficance of the aggregate production function. The question that then 
might be posed is to explain how and why a sector of society or society 
itself organizes itself in such a way as to behave like an individual, 
if indeed it does. Whatever the answer, this seems to be a question 
which economists have singularly failed to address.
At the risk of being repetitive I would emphasize here that making 
assumptions on the distribution of agents' characteristics amounts, in 
some sense, to making assumptions about the organization of society.
Thus if we obtain more structure by such assumptions we have to justify 
them. Thus anyone who makes significant progress in this direction either 
by examining and explaining the nature of interaction and communication 
between individuals yielding regularity at the aggregate level or by 
explaining how interaction may yield restrictions on the evolution of 
the distribution of agents'characteristics, will have made a radical 
step forward. I
I would like to conclude by emphasizing yet again that the significance 
of everything that I have said is greatest for the applied economist. Many 
theoreticians such as Hahn, Hildenbrand and Sonnenschein have already 
sounded warning notes. These are happy days for theorists since they have 
shown that by explicitly formalising a model and thus shedding harsh light 
on assumptions and conclusions the limited structure of that model become 
clear. Now remains the challenging task of either building a new structure 
perhaps by moving in the sort of direction I have mentioned. The practising 
economist is unfortunately less well placed. Probably he will behave just like 
the bumble bee when somebody proved that it could not fly, it kept on 
flying since nobody had informed it of this important result. Economists 
even when warned by theoreticians that current theory has very little to 
offer in the way of testable propositions will carry on just as if it does.
The difference is that the bumble bee does indeed fly whereas the economist 
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